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I  Introduction
Let’s say that two individuals are epistemic counterparts iff they hap-
pen to be in precisely the same (non-factive) mental states. If one has 
a veridical experience, her counterparts will undergo a subjectively 
indistinguishable conscious experience. If she remembers something, 
her counterparts will seem to recall the same event or fact. If she knows 
something to be true, her counterparts will believe it to be true. Coun-
terparts always fi nd the same things intuitive. Any difference between 
those who know a great deal about the external world and their sys-
tematically deceived counterparts is a difference the deceived counter-
parts could never appreciate.1
 1 Brewer (1999) suggests that if you have perceptual knowledge of the external 
world, you might know that you are not in the unfortunate situation of your 
deceived counterparts. He might say that there is a sense in which you can appre-
ciate the difference between your situation and the situation of someone deceived 
while allowing that your counterparts who undergo subjective indistinguishable 
hallucinatory experiences are in no position to appreciate the difference between 
their situation and yours.
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Suppose that when it comes to her mundane beliefs about her imme-
diate surroundings, Audrey gets things right as a rule. Audrey’s coun-
terpart Cooper is systematically deceived. Audrey sees that she is 
holding a book of matches, knows that she wants to light her stove, and 
strikes a match to light it. Coop seems to see a book of matches, thinks 
he has struck a match, and believes he has lit his stove. Because of the 
demon’s efforts, Coop undergoes these experiences in the dark. He 
strikes non-existent matches with phantom limbs. Intuition suggests 
that while Coop might be mistaken in nearly everything he believes 
about the external world, he is no less justifi ed in believing what he 
does than Audrey is justifi ed in believing what she does. To bolster the 
intuition and explain why we ought to regard mistaken beliefs backed 
by hallucinatory experiences as justifi ed and not merely excused, Audi 
offers these remarks:
… given the vivid hallucination, I am in no way at fault for believing what I do, 
nor do I deserve criticism. Far from it. I am like a surgeon who skillfully does all 
that can be expected but loses the patient. There I should feel regret, but not guilt; 
I should explain, but need not apologize; and when we know what my evidence 
was, we approve of what I did; we consider it reasonable.2
In general, it seems that what we ought to say about epistemic coun-
terparts is this:
Parity: Necessarily, if S and S’ are epistemic counterparts, S is jus-
tifi ed in believing p iff S’ is justifi ed in believing p.
Once we accept Parity as true, it is hard to see how we could reject 
Internalism or refuse to reject Externalism:
Internalism: Necessarily, the facts about the justifi cation of a sub-
ject’s beliefs are fi xed completely by the facts about the subject’s 
non-factive mental states.
Externalism: It is not the case that the facts about the justifi cation 
of a subject’s beliefs are fi xed completely by the facts about the 
subject’s non-factive mental states.3
 2 Audi (2001: 23)
 3 Externalism, so understood, is broad enough to encompass Goldman’s (1986) reli-
abilism, Sutton’s (2005) knowledge account of justifi ed belief, and Williamson’s 
(2000) view that a belief is justifi ed by the evidence which consists of propositions 
known. 
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To see why, consider two versions of Externalism. According to pro-
cess reliabilism, you cannot have a justifi ed belief about p unless the 
processes that led to that belief reliably lead to the truth.4 According 
to the knowledge account, you cannot have a justifi ed belief about p 
unless you know p.5 While Audrey arrives at her beliefs by means of 
reliable processes and those beliefs constitute knowledge, Coop arrives 
at his beliefs by the most unreliable of means and knows nothing of 
the external world. Assuming Parity is true, we have to say that he is 
no less justifi ed than she in spite of these external differences. Thus it 
seems justifi cation must be fi xed by the non-factive mental states that 
Audrey and Cooper share in common. The point seems perfectly gen-
eral. If you take the justifi cation of belief to involve some condition that 
does not strongly supervene on a subject’s non-factive mental states, it 
seems you’ve adopted a view of justifi cation incompatible with Parity. 
That your view is incompatible with Parity strongly suggests that your 
view is mistaken.
Most think that Parity and Externalism are incompatible.6 Many think 
that their incompatibility gives us good reason to reject Externalism.7 I 
shall argue that there is no good argument from Parity to Internalism. 
In §II, we will see that there are two problems with arguing from Par-
ity to Internalism. First, some versions of Externalism are consistent 
with Parity. As these views are incompatible with Internalism, Parity 
alone cannot give us conclusive reason to accept Internalism. Second, 
anyone who accepts Internalism on the grounds that Parity is true has 
to explain away the intuitions and theoretical considerations that moti-
vate Externalism. It seems, ceteris paribus, a view that accommodates 
the widest range of intuitions and theoretical observations is preferable 
to a view that requires you to explain away the considerations taken to 
motivate Internalism or Externalism. In §2, we shall see that External-
ism can accommodate the intuitions taken to motivate Internalism if 
 4 The new evil demon problem fi rst surfaced in Stewart Cohen’s (1984) discussion 
of the reliabilist views defended in Goldman (1979). The intuition fi gures promi-
nently in more recent criticism of externalist views. See Audi (2002), Bird (2007), 
Conee and Feldman (2004), Graham (forthcoming), Nelson (2002), Pollock and 
Cruz (forthcoming), and Wedgwood (2002). 
 5 Defended by Unger (1975) and more recently by Sutton (2005). Such a view seems 
to be a consequence of Hawthorne and Stanley’s (Forthcoming) account of justi-
fi ed use of belief in theoretical deliberation.
 6 Notable exceptions to this include Bach (1985) and Engel (1992).
 7 A notable exception to this is found in Brewer (1997) who insists that hallucinatory 
experiences that lead to false beliefs do not give the believer the right to believe, 
but only appear to.
402 Clayton Littlejohn
we revise some commonly held views about the logic of justifi cation 
ascriptions. In that section, I shall also argue that we have good reason 
to revise these views about the logic of justifi cation ascription. The aim 
of this paper is not to settle the debate between internalists and exter-
nalists, but to show that Externalism is compatible with the intuitions 
taken to motivate Internalism and that a strategy for settling this debate 
is far less promising than internalists have taken it to be.  
To preview a bit, there are really two thoughts that lead people to say 
that Externalism cannot be squared with our intuitions. First, there is 
the observation that considerations wholly inaccessible to a subject can-
not be relevant to whether this subject is justifi ed in her attitudes. I shall 
not take issue with this observation. Second, there is the assumption 
that only those considerations relevant to whether a subject is justifi ed 
in her beliefs are relevant to the justifi cation of her beliefs. There is, I 
shall argue, good reason to distinguish between the considerations that 
determine whether a believer is justifi ed (i.e., considerations that have 
to do with personal justifi cation) and the considerations that determine 
whether a belief is justifi ed (i.e., considerations that have to do with dox-
astic justifi cation). It is the second assumption that ought to be rejected. 
If it is possible for a believer to be justifi ed in holding beliefs that are not 
justifi ed, externalists can say that personal justifi cation is an internalist 
notion. It would not follow that doxastic justifi cation is also an internal-
ist notion. It may well be an externalist notion. Some will say that the 
distinction between a believer who is justifi ed in holding a belief and 
a believer holding a justifi ed belief is ad hoc. I shall offer two reasons 
for thinking that we ought to distinguish between personal and dox-
astic justifi cation. The fi rst is that drawing the distinction enables us to 
accommodate the widest range of intuitions possible. If the distinction 
is not incoherent, and I shall argue that it is not, the desire to accommo-
date the widest range of intuitions gives us some reason to recognize 
this distinction. The second is that such a distinction is needed to make 
sense of the more familiar distinction between the permissible and 
excusable. If the personal/doxastic justifi cation distinction is needed to 
make sense of our ordinary practice of normative appraisal, it cannot be 
out of bounds to appeal to this distinction in the context of the Internal-
ism/Externalism debate.
II  The New Evil Demon Problem
The problem of combining our theoretical views about epistemic justifi -
cation with the intuitions about undetectable error (i.e., those that sup-
port Parity) is commonly referred to as ‘the new evil demon problem.’ 
Nearly everyone thinks it is a problem for Externalism. Many think the 
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problem is insurmountable. Because it seems Externalism clashes so 
dramatically with our ordinary intuitions, it might be a good idea to 
start by explaining why someone might think that justifi cation must be 
an externalist notion.
The rationale for Externalism that I fi nd persuasive begins with the 
observation that anything that could justify believing p now in light of 
the information available rather than suspending judgment, it had bet-
ter justify assuming the risk that comes with committing to a view about 
p rather than remaining agnostic.8 If someone’s belief is adequately jus-
tifi ed, there must be a justifi cation for that belief that does what justi-
fi cations are supposed to. If that justifi cation does what it is supposed 
to, it justifi es closing deliberation prior to the acquisition of additional 
information. From the subject’s point of view, having come to believe 
p she will be inclined to think that any further information that comes 
to light will confi rm something she’s taken herself to know all along 
(i.e., that p is true), be perceived as misleading evidence (i.e., evidence 
that misleadingly suggests something she knows is not true), or show 
that she has made a mistake in having concluded that p is true on the 
basis of the information she had. Perhaps such a mistake is excusable, 
but such mistakes show that what she took to be a justifi cation was no 
justifi cation at all. A defective justifi cation, you might say, is no more 
a justifi cation than a decoy duck is a duck. You cannot have a justifi ed 
belief about p without a justifi cation for believing p. You cannot have a 
justifi cation for believing p if there are considerations that establish that 
it was wrongful for you to have judged that p is true on the basis of the 
considerations available to you when they judged that p is true.
Why think this picture favors Externalism? I might say that you can-
not defend Coop’s believing that p in light of the fact that Coop had no 
evidence that supported his belief that p. Because there is no defending 
him for having believed p, I might conclude that his belief about p was 
not justifi ed. That Coop cannot be defended in light of how he came 
to the belief is something we establish (in part) by examining those 
facts that supervene on his non-factive mental states. No one should 
 8 The rationale for Externalism I am offering here is different from the rationale 
found in earlier defenses of Externalism. Sosa (1985), for example, seems to defend 
Externalism on the grounds that whatever justifi es a belief cannot be the sort of 
thing that obtains wholly independently from the truth of the belief because of 
the role that justifi cation must play in the production of knowledge. The argu-
ment offered here rests on no assumptions about the role justifi cation plays in the 
production of knowledge. Motivated in this way, I think Externalism is immune to 
the objection that externalists have confl ated justifi cation and warrant. See Pollock 
and Cruz (forthcoming) for a version of this objection.
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deny that a belief might fail to be justifi ed in virtue of how things stand 
internal to the subject. The reason that this picture is supposed to favor 
Externalism is that we do not think that beliefs are criticized solely on 
the basis of considerations available to the believer. If our criticism 
implies fault, perhaps our criticism is based upon considerations avail-
able to Coop. However, not all criticism of someone’s belief implies 
fault. We sometimes we criticize a belief because of considerations we 
know to be unavailable to believer without implying that the believer 
ought to be faulted for her mistake.
Some externalists will say that it is part of our ordinary practice of 
epistemic appraisal to say that Coop should not believe p because he is 
non-culpably mistaken.9 Others will say that it is part of our ordinary 
practice to say Coop should not believe p because he has unwittingly 
arrived at that belief by way of a method that is wholly unreliable.10 If 
what it is to have a justifi ed belief is to have a belief that can be defended 
against criticism (whether that is criticism based on considerations 
available to the believer or available only to those who appraise the 
believer’s beliefs) it seems to follow that the conditions that determine 
whether a belief is justifi ed include those that supervene on our non-
factive mental states but are not limited to such conditions. Justifi cation 
is an externalist notion because defensibly believing something is an 
externalist notion.
Internalists will likely say that criticisms that appeal to consider-
ations beyond those available to the believer are not criticisms that a 
justifi cation seeks to address.11 This point, if taken seriously, leads to an 
odd sort of view. On this view, the justifi cation of a belief is described as 
something that does not even aspire to show that the subject is right to 
judge p by showing that considerations not presently accessible to the 
subject will not show that she was mistaken to judge that p is true on 
the basis of what was available to her. (If the subject was non-culpably 
mistaken to judge that p is true on the basis of what was available to 
her, on many internalist views this shows that there was nothing wrong 
with the subject’s justifi cation.) It does not seem from the subject’s point 
of view that having an adequate justifi cation is neutral on the question 
as to whether there is some basis for correctly criticizing her belief as 
mistaken. If it did, theoretical deliberation would not close with the 
subject taking the available justifi cation to be adequate. Perhaps inter-
nalists might say that a justifi cation might succeed in justifying a belief 
 9 I imagine Sutton (2005) and Unger (1975) might say this.
10 I would expect Goldman (1986) to say something to this effect.
11 This seems to be Bird’s (2007) view.
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while failing to do what it is intended to do or what the subject thinks 
it must do in order to justify adopting a belief rather than remaining 
agnostic (i.e., constitute a defense of having come to believe p on the 
basis of the available information). The awkwardness of such a view 
emerges when we realize that this view has it that beliefs might be per-
fectly justifi ed by defective justifi cations or justifi cations the subject is 
disposed to think of as defective.
As odd as such a view might look, internalists are quick to remind 
us that while we might say that people should not believe what they 
do because they are mistaken or because they have unwittingly relied 
on an unreliable process, when our basis for saying that they should 
not believe something appeals to considerations beyond those that per-
tain to the subject’s non-factive mental states we will say that the sub-
ject was justifi ed in believing p. So, we have to address their new evil 
demon argument against Externalism:
(1)  Although Coop is systematically deceived, he is justifi ed in 
believing what he believes about the external world.
(2)  Because Coop is systematically deceived, he does not come 
to his beliefs on the basis of reliable processes or the sorts of 
veridical experiences and genuine memories that can serve as 
the basis for knowledge.
(C)  Hence, none of the conditions beyond those that supervene on 
our non-factive mental states have any bearing on the justifi ca-
tion of our beliefs.
Although the argument might initially seem quite persuasive, the argu-
ment’s implicit assumptions are far from innocent. Intuitions about 
counterparts clearly play an important role in the argument, but the 
argument does not rest on intuition alone. The additional assumptions 
needed to argue from Parity to Internalism are assumptions we have 
good reason to reject.
1. A Hidden Assumption
In this section, I want to point to two problems with arguing from Par-
ity to Internalism. First, the argument does not exclude certain forms 
of Externalism unless we introduce additional assumptions. These 
assumptions we have little reason to accept and good reason to reject. 
Second, there are intuitions that seem to favor Externalism and seem 
to be compatible with the intuitions taken to motivate Parity. Just as 
the externalist faces the task of accommodating or explaining away the 
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intuitions taken to motivate Internalism, the internalist cannot claim 
that theirs is a view unequivocally supported by intuition.
The argument from Parity to Internalism is invalid. According to 
Parity, if two individuals are epistemic counterparts, they are justi-
fi ed in believing the same things. According to Internalism, the facts 
about the justifi cation of an individual’s beliefs strongly supervene on 
facts about that individual’s non-factive mental states. Internalism is 
logically stronger than Parity. For all that Parity tells us, Audrey and 
Cooper might be justifi ed in believing precisely the same things even if 
Audrey’s justifi cation for her beliefs differs from Coop’s. Parity is con-
sistent with a view on which both Audrey and Cooper believe what 
they do on the basis of evidence that warrants our saying that they 
are justifi ed in their beliefs while insisting that Audrey’s evidence goes 
beyond Coop’s evidence. If Audrey’s evidence outstrips Coop’s evi-
dence, it seems Audrey has ‘external’ epistemic reasons for her beliefs 
that Coop does not and Internalism tells us could not exist. For all that 
Parity tells us, Audrey’s reasons for her beliefs are better than Coop’s. 
This comparative judgment is incompatible with Internalism, but it is 
consistent with Parity. Thus, Parity does not entail Internalism.
To rule out such responses, what the argument for Internalism 
requires an additional assumption:
Equality: Necessarily, if S and S’ are epistemic counterparts, 
the fact that q is relevant to the justifi cation of what S believes 
iff the fact that q is true is relevant to the justifi cation of what S’ 
believes.
Equality comes with costs I’m not sure we should willingly pay. 
Assume that some evidence is propositional. Assume knowledge of a 
proposition’s truth is suffi cient for that proposition’s inclusion in your 
evidence. Assume false propositions cannot be part of our evidence.12 
Finally, assume that the sceptic is wrong and it is possible to have 
12 Williamson (2000) defends each of these assumptions in the course of arguing that 
our evidence consists of all and only what we know (‘E = K’ hereafter). A defense 
of E = K is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Note that the assumptions listed 
above did not include what I take to be the most controversial aspect of William-
son’s view, which is that knowledge of p’s truth is necessary for p’s inclusion in your 
evidence. This assumption has the unfortunate consequence that being in a Gettier 
case can have an affect on your evidence. Silins (2005) has argued that E = K con-
fl icts with independently plausible assumptions about the sort of access we have 
to our evidence. Dodd (2007) has argued that E = K commits us to an infallibilist 
account of justifi cation that engenders scepticism. I address these objections in 
Littlejohn (ms. a) and (forthcoming).
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knowledge of the external world. With these assumptions in place, sup-
pose Audrey knowingly infers r from p. Coop mistakenly believes p and 
infers that r is true. Audrey’s knowledge of p is based on veridical expe-
rience. Cooper’s belief that p is true is induced by hallucinatory experi-
ence. If knowledge of p’s truth is suffi cient for p’s inclusion in Audrey’s 
evidence, among the facts relevant to the facts about the justifi cation of 
her beliefs is that p is part of her evidence. If the falsity of p is suffi cient 
for p’s exclusion from Coop’s evidence, there are reasons for Audrey 
to believe r that are not among the reasons for Coop to believe this. To 
save Equality, you either have to say that we cannot have knowledge of 
propositions about the external world, that there can be false proposi-
tions included in someone’s evidence, or that knowledge is not enough 
for a proposition’s inclusion in someone’s evidence. Whatever reason 
you have for rejecting one or more of these assumptions, it cannot be 
that these assumptions confl ict with Parity or the intuitions that moti-
vate it. These assumptions, although incompatible with Equality, are 
perfectly consistent with Parity.
I do not offer this in the hopes of refuting Internalism, but merely 
to show that an assumption needed to argue from Parity to Internal-
ism comes with costs. I know of no one who thinks that false proposi-
tions can serve as evidence. It strikes me as exceptionally odd to say of 
someone something to the effect of, ‘Although they know they have 
hands, that is no reason for them to believe they are not handless’. Yet, if 
knowledge of a proposition’s truth did not suffi ce for that proposition’s 
inclusion in someone’s evidence, I just cannot see how there could be a 
principled reason to think such a remark must be mistaken.
2. Further Intuitions
The fi rst problem with running the argument from Parity to Internal-
ism is that the argument requires an assumption about epistemic rel-
evance that has no clear motivation and comes with real costs. The 
second problem facing the internalist who wants to claim that theirs is 
the view supported by intuition is that it seems there are intuitions that 
support the following thesis:
Asymmetry: It is possible for there to be a pair of epistemic coun-
terparts, S and S’, such that (a) only one of the pair has good 
enough reason to believe p and have a justifi ed belief about p or 
(b) S has better reasons to believe p than S’ has.
For reasons sketched above, I think it is clear that Asymmetry is incom-
patible with Internalism. So, if there are some intuitions that support 
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Asymmetry, it is misleading to suggest that Internalism fi nds unequiv-
ocal support in intuition.
Imagine Audrey imagines that her counterpart Cooper has been 
wholly deceived by a Cartesian demon. She thinks to herself:
(1)  If there is no more reason for me to believe I have hands than 
there is for Coop to believe he has hands, I should not believe I 
have them.
(2)  If my reasons for believing I have hands are no better than his, 
I really have no good reason for believing I have hands.
Intuitively, these strike me as correct. Contrast them with the following 
thought:
(3)  Even if there is no more reason for me to believe I have hands 
than there is for Coop to believe he has hands, there is nothing 
wrong with my continuing to believe I have hands.
I do not think that the oddity of (3) is due to its fi rst-personal formula-
tion. Suppose Audrey is told that Ben and Cooper are both her epis-
temic counterparts. She is told that Coop is systematically deceived. 
She is not told whether Ben is systematically deceived or any less reli-
able in his judgments about the external world than she is. I think it 
would be right for her to say:
(4)  If there is no more reason for Ben to believe he has hands than 
there is for Coop to believe he has hands, Ben should not believe 
this.
(5)  If there is no more reason for Ben to believe he has hands than 
there is for Coop, I would advise him against believing this. 
If, however, he was in a position to know that he has hands I 
would not advise him against believing this.
If your scorecard is anything like mine, you reject (3) but accept (1), (2), 
(4), and (5). The intuitions that lead someone to accept (1), (2), (4), and 
(5) support Asymmetry. If my intuitions are correct, there is intuitive 
support for both Asymmetry and Externalism. Intuitions being what 
they are, I cannot assume that they are universally shared. Someone 
might object that the intuitions I am hoping to elicit are intuitions shared 
only by infallibilist sceptics or externalists.13 Let me say three things 
13 An anonymous referee raised this worry.
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in response. First, the intuitions do support Externalism, but they do 
not support infallibilism. Although these intuitions are consistent with 
infallibilism, they are also accommodated by fallibilist views such as 
reliabilism or the knowledge account of justifi ed belief.14 Second, even 
if no one with internalist sympathies shares these intuitions, it is impor-
tant to remember that the aim of this paper is not to refute Internalism, 
much less refute Internalism appealing to considerations internalists 
accept. The aim is to show how it is possible to accommodate the wid-
est range of intuitions possible within an externalist framework. We 
cannot deny that people have these intuitions even if those intuitions 
strike us as mistaken. Confronted by those who have such intuitions, 
we have to choose between taking them at face value and building our 
theories around them or explaining them away. I would rather accom-
modate the intuitions of both internalists and externalists if possible. 
Third, I do not think we can assume that those who fi nd Internalism 
intuitive will fi nd (1), (2), (4) and (5) counterintuitive. In trying to elicit 
the intuitions that supported Parity, we stipulate that the relevant sub-
jects are mistaken in their beliefs. This means that the question as to 
whether we ought to agree with the relevant subjects is no longer open. 
This shifts our focus away from a question along the lines of, ‘What are 
we to think of what they believe?’ to a question more along the lines of, 
‘Given that they are mistaken, what are we to think of them?’ In trying 
to elicit the intuitions I think support Asymmetry, the question as to 
whether the subject is mistaken is left open as is the question, ‘Given 
what their reasons are, ought we agree with them in believing what 
they do?’ By focusing explicitly on the quality of reasons rather than 
on the subject in the wake of that subject’s mistaken response, I do not 
think it would be surprising to fi nd those with internalist sympathies 
or no settled view fi nding (1), (2), (4), and (5) intuitive.
I wish to make one more point in favor of Asymmetry because I think 
this sort of argument has not yet surfaced in the literature on epistemic 
justifi cation. Empirical research suggests that when it comes to the 
justifi cation of action, the folk think that the justifi cation of an action 
14 Sutton’s (2005) view on which a belief is justifi ed only if that belief constitutes 
knowledge amounts to a version of fallibilism as it is typically understood. As it 
is typically understood, the infallibilist asserts that a belief can be justifi ed only if 
there are infallible grounds or evidence available for that belief. See Cohen (1988). 
Because of the factivity of knowledge, Sutton’s view has the implication that there 
are no false, justifi ed beliefs. However, the view does not have the implication that 
there are no justifi ed beliefs based on fallible grounds because there is no reason 
to assume that knowledge requires having infallible grounds for a belief. Thus, 
Sutton’s view is a version of fallibilism as it is typically understood in spite of the 
fact that it rules out the possibility of a false belief being justifi ed. 
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depends on more than just what is in the agent’s head. I would be sur-
prised if the folk were disposed to think that the justifi cation of action 
depends on more than just what is in the agent’s head but when it came 
to the justifi cation of those beliefs that lead to action the justifi cation 
in no way depended on factors external to the subject’s perspective. If 
folk intuition treats actions motivated by non-culpably held mistaken 
beliefs as excusable rather than justifi ed, why would the folk think of 
the beliefs that led to these actions as perfectly justifi ed?
An internalist is free to deny the relevance of such intuitions when 
it comes to selecting between competing theories of epistemic justifi ca-
tion, but I think that given their theoretical commitments, internalists 
will have a diffi cult time making sense of a hybrid view that allows 
that the justifi cation of action depends (in part) upon features of the 
objective circumstances while denying that the justifi cation of belief 
depends on these same features. If the hybrid view does not sit well 
with the internalist’s theoretical commitments, the internalist either has 
to explain away the folk intuitions about justifi ed action or might help 
themselves to the sort of distinction I shall argue saves the externalist 
from the charge that theirs is a view that confl icts with intuition and 
undermines the new evil demon argument. They can square their view 
with folk intuition by saying that theirs is a view that concerns personal 
justifi cation and is thus a theory about what it takes for the person to 
be justifi ed in the face of certain sort of criticism. In so doing, however, 
they would have to concede that the new evil demon argument is not a 
cogent argument against Externalism or externalist accounts of doxastic 
justifi cation.
So, let us consider a view that combines an externalist account of 
justifi ed action with an internalist account of justifi ed belief. On this 
hybrid view, the justifi cation of an action depends on whether the agent 
has acted against an undefeated reason against performing that action. 
That the agent is unaware of the reason might serve as an excuse, it 
does not show that the reason does not so much as bear on the justifi -
ability of the relevant action. If the agent unwittingly harms another 
and is not culpable in her failure to appreciate that her actions will harm 
another, the action is prima facie wrongful even though the agent cannot 
be faulted for having caused the harm. If there is no overriding reason 
that justifi es the imposition of that harm, the action will turn out to be 
all things considered wrong. However, on this view, if it seems ‘from 
the inside’ that there is no overriding reason to refrain from performing 
the action and the agent cannot be faulted for failing to appreciate that 
there is such a reason, the belief that leads her to act (e.g., the belief that 
this is the thing to do) is itself justifi ed.
To see what a view amounts to, let us consider two concrete exam-
ples. Ben has fallen behind in his payments to Jacques, a loan shark. 
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Last week, Jacques gave Ben a severe beating with the warning that if 
he is not paid within the week, he will kill Ben. Ben starts carrying a 
gun and spending most of his time in public places in the hopes that 
Jacques would not attack him if there were people present to witness 
the attack. One afternoon, Ben is in the diner. The story might continue 
in one of two ways. The fi rst version of the story goes like this. You see 
Jacques’ twin brother enter the diner. You know it to be Jacques’ twin, 
know that Ben knows nothing of this twin, and know that Jacques’ twin 
is harmless. You know he does not look harmless as he looks just like 
the very dangerous Jacques. Seeing the man approach, Ben produces 
his gun and yells ‘You won’t get me Jacques!’ You know that if you do 
nothing Ben will shoot Jacques’ twin on the belief that this is necessary 
for self-defense and so you lunge at Ben. You knock him down, his shot 
misses Jacques, and Ben is injured as a result. The second version of 
the story goes like this. You see Ben enter the diner and Jacques follow 
soon after. Seeing Jacques approach, Ben produces his gun and yells, 
‘You won’t get me Jacques!’ You see his fi rst shot miss and Jacques pull 
out a gun to return fi re. As Ben struggles to reload, you hit Jacques with 
a chair. You knock him down, he loses his gun, and he is injured as a 
result of your striking him.
It seems that in both situations your reactions were morally justi-
fi ed. In fact, it seems that they were supererogatory. What does this tell 
us? For one, it suggests that in the fi rst example, Ben lost his right to 
non-interference. He loses no such right in the second. This suffi ces to 
explain the further intuition that you owe Ben nothing for his injuries 
in the fi rst story but would had you intervened in just this same way 
in the second. It seems so because the grounds of self-defense were not 
present in the fi rst example. That the grounds of self-defense did not 
obtain in the fi rst case suggests that his action was less justifi ed than the 
action he performed in the second case. Yet, it seems that the relevant 
mental states were the same in both cases. Thus, it seems that it is not 
true that the justifi cation of Ben’s actions depends wholly on Ben’s non-
factive mental states.
This much seems to be supported by folk intuition. If this much 
is right but we were to insist that while the justifi catory status of his 
actions differed in these two cases the justifi catory status of his beliefs 
were the same in both cases, we would have to reject the following 
principle, linking justifi ed belief to justifi ed action:
Link:  If S’s belief that -ing is permissible is justifi ed, S’s -ing is 
justifi ed.
The idea behind Link is rather straightforward. Suppose we say that 
Ben’s pulling the trigger just was his shooting Jacques. In turn, his 
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shooting Spike just was his acting on the beliefs and desires that involve, 
inter alia, the belief that the grounds for self-defense justifi ed his shoot-
ing. While believing p and allowing yourself to reason from the belief 
that p are two different things and Leibniz’s Law will not compel us to 
assign the same deontic status to the believing and the reasoning from 
the belief, it seems odd to think that there is something about the rea-
soning from the belief that prevents it from being justifi ed and nothing 
that prevents the belief itself from being justifi ed. Yet, that seems to be 
what the hybrid view is committed to insofar as it concedes that the 
acting on the relevant belief, which just was Ben’s shooting, was not 
justifi ed while the relevant belief (i.e., that shooting is the thing to do) 
is itself perfectly justifi ed. Such a view would require the internalist to 
say that there is one set of considerations that determine whether it is 
permissible to let the belief that p fi gure in deliberation and another that 
determines whether to believe p. I’m not sure it is coherent to distin-
guish these considerations in this way.
I think we can show that the costs that come with denying Link are 
costs internalists should be unwilling to pay. Moreover, I think we can 
establish Link on the grounds that it is incoherent to draw the distinc-
tion between the considerations that determine whether relying on 
the belief that p in deliberation is justifi ed and the considerations that 
determine whether believing p is justifi ed. First, it is worth noting that 
you cannot reject Link without also rejecting the following principle:
Fault: If S’s -ing were unjustifi ed, S could be faulted for having 
’d.
If you reject Link, it is possible for someone to have ’d having a justi-
fi ed belief that they ought to  even if the -ing itself could not be justi-
fi ed. Surely if someone was not wrong to believe that they ought to  
or are permitted to  and ’d from the right sort of motives, they could 
not be faulted for having ’d. Whatever we pointed to in order to show 
that they could be faulted would have to be conditions of which they 
were culpably unaware or aware of but culpably failed to take proper 
account of in deliberation. Either way, we could not sustain the judg-
ment that the subject’s belief about the deontic status of -ing was itself 
justifi ed. I don’t think internalists would be happy to reject Fault since 
when it comes to justifi ed belief they often wish to say that the condi-
tions you could not be faulted for are conditions that have no bearing 
on the justifi cation of your beliefs. While they might say that when it 
comes to belief, conditions for which you cannot be faulted for failing to 
take account of do not affect justifi cation, but when it comes to action, 
the situation is different. But, it is not clear how they could defend this. 
It cannot be defended on the grounds that it is part of the concept of 
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justifi cation that the conditions that determine whether something is 
justifi ed is determined wholly by conditions the subject can be faulted 
for failing to take account of. They have just denied this. So, it seems 
that denying Link is costly for internalists insofar as the denial of Link 
commits you to the denial of Fault.
Not only is the denial of Link costly for internalists, the denial of Link 
also seems incoherent. On a view that asserts that the justifi cation of 
action can depend on factors the agent cannot be faulted for failing to 
take account of but denies that the justifi cation of belief can depend on 
such factors, it seems that these should be open questions:
(6)  I know that I should believe that I ought to , but what should 
I do?
(7)  I know that he should believe that he ought to , but should 
he?
I don’t think these are open questions. From the deliberative perspec-
tive, there is no intelligible gap between the judgment that you ought to 
 and the judgment that you ought to believe that you ought to . From 
the perspective of the outside observer, there seems to be no intelligi-
ble gap between the beliefs you think the advisee ought to hold about 
what they ought to do and the actions you think the advisee ought to 
perform. However, if you combined an internalist account of justifi ed 
belief with an externalist account of justifi ed action, you would have 
to allow for the possibility of situations in which an agent ought not 
perform the actions they ought to believe that they ought to form. You 
would have no explanation as to why these questions seem closed from 
both an internal and external standpoint.
If an internalist were to accept Link, they could avoid these diffi culties 
but then their view would confl ict with the intuitions that lead people to 
endorse views on which the justifi cation of an action depends (in part) 
upon conditions external to the agent’s perspective on the situation. 
Thus, the internalist would be open to the charge that theirs is a view 
that fails to accommodate intuition much in the way that they suggest 
the externalist cannot accommodate intuition. Of course, the intuitions 
that cause trouble for these views are different intuitions, but it is mis-
leading to suggest that Internalism is the view supported by intuition. 
It is a view that receives support from some intuitions, perhaps, but it 
confl icts with others and is not unique in its ability to accommodate the 
intuitions that underwrite the new evil demon argument. At least, that 
is what I hope to show in the next part of the paper.
To sum up, we have seen that internalists that look to motivate their 
view by appeal to the intuitions backing Parity face a pair of problems. 
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The fi rst is that those intuitions alone cannot motivate Internalism 
unless combined with a further assumption about epistemic relevance 
that may prove costly to accept. Reject Equality and the argument from 
Parity to Internalism fails. The second is that some hold intuitions 
that appear to be consistent with the intuitions that support Parity but 
inconsistent with internalist accounts of epistemic justifi cation. First, 
there were the intuitions about comparative epistemic judgments that 
suggested that having a justifi ed belief might require having better rea-
sons than those available to the systematically deceived. Second, there 
were intuitions about justifi ed action that indirectly seemed to support 
Asymmetry. As Asymmetry might prove to be consistent with Parity 
but inconsistent with Internalism, we can now see that the internalist 
cannot claim that theirs is a view that accommodates the widest range 
of intuitions possible. Although internalists could deny the relevance 
of intuitions about justifi ed action when it comes to selecting between 
competing theories of epistemic justifi cation, to dismiss the relevance 
of these intuitions the internalists have to reject Link. It seems that such 
a denial is costly as it forces the internalist to deny that there is any 
conceptual connection between factors a subject can be faulted for fail-
ing to take account of and factors that bear on justifi cation. Moreover, 
it seemed that the denial of Link is incoherent. In short, the new evil 
demon argument for Internalism or against Externalism is far more 
problematic than I think people have appreciated previously.
III  Justifi cation Ascriptions
Taken at face value, a certain kind of intuition supports Parity. Taken 
at face value, a certain kind of intuition supports Asymmetry. If you 
thought Parity supported Internalism and Asymmetry entailed Exter-
nalism, you might conclude that our intuitions support two incompat-
ible accounts of epistemic justifi cation. The pessimist might conclude 
that such intuitions cannot be trusted and should not serve as the basis 
for theory selection. It seems that the intuition that our deceived coun-
terparts are no less justifi ed than our successful epistemic counterparts 
shows that it is possible for someone to be justifi ed in holding their 
beliefs provided that things appear a certain way to them regardless 
of what is actually taking place around them. Other intuitions suggest 
that the conditions necessary for having a justifi ed belief could only 
obtain if the reasons someone has for their beliefs are better than the 
reasons the systematically deceived have for theirs. I think pessimism 
is unwarranted. We can accommodate both sets of intuitions.
The obstacle to accommodating both sets of intuitions seems to be 
this. Supposing that Audrey knows p on the basis of veridical percep-
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tion and Coop believes p on the basis of hallucinatory experiences 
indistinguishable from Audrey’s experiences, we want to say:
(1) Audrey and Coop are both justifi ed in believing p.
In turn, this is supposed to entail:
(2)  There is suffi cient justifi cation for Audrey and Coop’s beliefs 
about p.
We have seen that by denying Equality, a defender of Externalism might 
accept (1) as well as the inference to (2), but say:
(3)  The justifi cation that Coop has for his beliefs is suffi cient. It is 
distinct from the justifi cation that Audrey has for her beliefs as 
the justifi cation Audrey has incorporates all of Coop’s evidence 
and evidence he lacks.15
The claim that the justifi cation of Audrey’s beliefs is overdetermined is, 
perhaps, true enough. However, this response I think does not quite go 
far enough. For we have seen that some of our intuitions about coun-
terparts support stronger versions of Externalism that are incompatible 
with (2). That is to say, we saw in the last part of the previous section 
that there was some intuitive support for the claim that not only could 
it be that Audrey’s reasons for holding her beliefs are better than the rea-
sons Coop had for holding his, but also that only Audrey’s reasons were 
good enough. And while this is consistent with the idea that Audrey’s 
beliefs are supported by more justifi cation than she might need to per-
missibly hold her belief, it suggests that there might be something right 
about a version of Externalism on which (2) turns out to be false.
Someone will say that if we reject (2) we must reject (1) as well. And 
that suggests that we have to reject Parity. In turn, that suggests that 
internalists are right to say that Externalism clashes with fi rm intuitions 
about justifi cation. In this fi nal section I shall argue that the way to sort 
this mess out is to deny that claims like (2) are logically entailed by 
claims like (1). If this is right, we can say that externalists are right to 
reject (2) and their critics are wrong to accuse the externalist of failing 
to accommodate the intuitions that back (1).
15 This seems to be Williamson’s (2000) position. Collins (1997) defends a similar 
view. Because neither author takes account of the intuitions I have claimed sup-
port Asymmetry, I think they see this as the only option for Externalism. It is an 
option, to be sure, but it is not the only one. 
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On the standard view of justifi cation ascriptions, (1) entails (2). On 
the standard view of things, we can say that three kinds of justifi cation 
ascription are related as follows:
(SV1) S is justifi ed in believing p iff S’s belief that p is justifi ed. 
(SV2) S’s belief that p is justifi ed iff there is a suffi cient justifi cation 
for S to believe p and this is the basis on which S believes p.
According to (SV1), personal and doxastic justifi cation ascriptions are 
equivalent. According to (SV2), ascriptions of propositional justifi cation 
are logically entailed by ascriptions of doxastic justifi cation. If, as I shall 
argue, we ought to revise this account of the logical relations between 
various kinds of justifi cation ascription by rejecting (SV1), then perhaps 
we can make sense of a view on which (1) is true and (2) is false. We 
can try to make sense of a view on which someone can be justifi ed in 
believing p even if there is not suffi cient justifi cation for the belief they 
hold. Such a view would make sense of those intuitions that supported 
Parity and Asymmetry.
I shall offer a sketch of an account of justifi cation and explain why 
someone attracted to such a view of how justifi cations work will likely 
think that the standard view oversimplifi es matters. Next, I will look at 
a pair of defenses of the standard view and argue that neither is ade-
quate. I will conclude with an argument for revising the standard view 
on the grounds that doing so is necessary for making sense of a more 
familiar distinction between excuses and permissions.
1. What Justifi cations Do
Various things call for justifi cation. You might be called on to justify a 
decision, or a belief, or someone who made a decision or held a belief. 
What is it that a justifi cation must do if it is to be successful? On the view 
I would like to propose, we should think of justifi cations as defenses:
(JD) To successfully justify something is to successfully defend it.
That which cannot call for a defense against criticism is not something 
that calls for a justifi cation. If a justifi cation is called for and a defense 
cannot be given, I cannot imagine that a justifi cation might be given in 
its place. You might worry that there is more to a justifi cation than just 
a defense. After all, to say that a belief is justifi ed is to say that there is 
some positive reason for holding it.16 While that is true, I think it causes 
16 An anonymous referee raised this objection.
The Externalist’s Demon 417
no trouble for (JD). The reason I think this does not cause trouble for 
the proposal is that if we have identifi ed that someone believes p and 
we know they have no positive reason for holding that belief, this fact 
alone will prevent us from offering a proper defense of that particular 
belief. If you assume that someone’s believing p is an instance of epis-
temic irresponsibility and a defense of that belief is going to involve 
something that establishes that the believer who holds this particular 
belief has not been irresponsible, it follows from (JD) that this belief 
cannot be justifi ed precisely because the believer has no positive reason 
to believe p. Thus, (JD) pronounces such beliefs unjustifi ed.
(JD) is a thesis about pleas. We’re looking at theories about properties 
and truth-conditions of statements that ascribe such properties. If I’m to 
take observations about pleas as observations that favor some account 
of justifi cation, I need some way of linking claims about pleas to claims 
about properties. One way to link claims about pleas to claims about 
properties is by means of the ‘process-property integration thesis’:
(PPI)  Something is justifi able only if it has the property or properties 
that would in principle constitute a successful justifi cation of it 
if cited.17
If something lacks certain properties, it cannot be defended from criti-
cism or justifi ed and cannot have the status of being justifi ed. We defend 
things against criticism by citing the features of the thing that show the 
criticism to be unwarranted. So, on the proposal I am offering here, if 
we can identify the types of criticism to which something is subject and 
the conditions under which such criticism can be negated, we can in 
turn identify the conditions under which the thing is justifi ed.
We can save Externalism from the charge that it is unintuitive by 
drawing a distinction between the conditions under which a believer 
can be justifi ed and the conditions under which a belief can be justifi ed.18 
17 Audi (1993: 305). Note that the view is not that by asserting that a belief has some 
property, the belief is justifi ed if the audience accepts that the belief has such prop-
erties. Rather, the idea is that if the audience takes your assertion at face value, 
they will agree that the properties you assert that the belief has constitutes a justi-
fi cation for that belief.
18 Bach (1985) and Engel (1992) appeal to such a distinction to defend reliabilism. 
Bach thinks personal justifi cation ascriptions refl ect our sense of the goodness of 
the epistemic ‘action’ that led to a belief. The trouble with explaining the distinc-
tion in this way is that if epistemic actions call for justifi cation, we ought to be 
able to distinguish between a person being justifi ed in an epistemic action and 
an epistemic action being justifi ed. If such actions do not call for justifi cation, it is 
not clear how we can say that a person being justifi ed is to be understood in terms 
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If such conditions need not coincide, according to (JD), it is possible for 
a believer to be justifi ed when the belief held is not. To see why the stan-
dard view does not allow for such a possibility, assume the intuitions 
that support Parity are correct and that (1) is true. It follows from this 
and (SV1) that (2) is true. Whereas externalists will say that conditions 
beyond those that supervene on the subject’s non-factive mental states 
have to be taken into consideration in determining whether someone’s 
belief is justifi ed, it follows from this and (SV1) that in determining 
whether the subject is justifi ed in believing these same conditions need 
to be taken account of. As we know that only the conditions that super-
vene on a subject’s non-factive mental states are needed to determine 
whether, say, Coop is justifi ed in his beliefs, it would follow that only 
such conditions can determine whether Coop’s beliefs are justifi ed.
To bring out the tension between the standard view and (JD), defend-
ers of Externalism will say that in order to defend someone’s belief 
about p from criticism, we have to take account of both how things 
stand with the believer’s mental states and in the believer’s circum-
stances. For while we sometimes criticize beliefs on the grounds that 
they are not supported by the evidence of the believer, we often criticize 
beliefs for misrepresenting how things are or for being arrived at as the 
result of a process that is not reliable. If a defense of the belief aspires to 
show that such criticism is unwarranted and a belief is justifi able only 
if defensible, a belief could only be justifi ed on those occasions where 
‘external’ criticism (i.e., criticism that does not appeal to conditions the 
subject can be faulted for failing to take account of) is unwarranted. 
However, we do not criticize believers on such external grounds. It is no 
criticism of Coop that he makes a mistake. It is only a criticism of Coop 
if we say that he is culpable or responsible for the mistake.
Here is the argument from (JD) against (SV1):
(4)  Something can be justifi ed iff it can be defended [(JD)].
(5)  A subject, S, can be defended from criticism for having ’d if 
she is properly excused for having ’d.
(6)  A subject, S, can be excused for having ’d even if her -ing 
was all things considered wrong.
of our evaluation of epistemic action. Engel suggests that the personal/doxastic 
justifi cation distinction coincides with the distinction between reliable beliefs and 
excusably held beliefs and adopts a view similar to Goldman (1988). He does not 
argue that we need to draw the distinction to accommodate intuition or why we 
ought to identify excusably held belief with a person being justifi ed in holding that 
belief. 
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(7)  If S’s -ing is all things considered wrong, S’s -ing cannot be 
justifi ed.
(C)  It is possible that S is justifi ed in -ing even if S’s -ing is not 
justifi ed.
This conclusion follows from the premises above and it is not clear 
which premise someone should reject in order to save the standard 
view. Someone might reject (4), but that requires saying that you can 
give a defense of something without being able to justify it. What 
would this defense amount to? Someone might reject (5), but then it 
would seem that she would say that a subject could be open to criticism 
for that which she cannot be faulted. In turn, that suggests that the truth 
of ascriptions of personal justifi cation would potentially depend upon 
external considerations. If (5) were false, Externalism would be true. 
If (6) is false, the very notion of excuse must be incoherent. What is to 
be excused is the wrongness of an action or attitude. The upshot of an 
excuse is that the wrongness of the action or attitude does not refl ect 
badly on the agent who performed the action or held the attitude. (7) 
says that an attitude can only be justifi ed if the attitude is not all things 
considered wrong. To deny this is to allow that conditions can make 
it such that a belief is wrongfully held but justifi ably held. From the 
deliberative perspective, it seems that it would be very odd to judge 
that a belief is justifi ed and then wonder whether it is wrong to hold the 
belief. What was the justifi cation doing for the believer in deliberation 
if it was not, inter alia, establishing that the attitude was not wrongfully 
held? From an external perspective, it seems that the very conditions I 
would use to show that a belief is wrongfully held are the conditions I 
would use to argue that the belief is not justifi ed.
Perhaps those who defend the standard view will say that the incom-
patibility of that view and (JD) shows we ought to reject (JD). We shall 
look at two arguments for the standard view, but I think neither argu-
ment gives us good reason for adopting this view.
2. Ordinary Language
Someone might say that the appeal to some distinction such as the 
distinction between personal and doxastic justifi cation is ad hoc unless 
there is evidence of such a distinction found in ordinary language. Sup-
pose I am trying to determine whether to believe p. I consider the avail-
able evidence and think to myself:
(8)  I am justifi ed in believing p.
Then I ask myself, ‘But what of the belief?’ Sceptical, perhaps, I add:
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 (9)  There is not suffi cient justifi cation for believing p.
If (SV1) is false, it is possible for (8) and (9) to be true. Yet, this is an ear-
bruising assertion:
(10)  I am justifi ed in believing p, but there is no justifi cation for 
believing p.
The natural explanation as to why (10) strikes us as contradictory is 
that it is in fact a contradiction. If it is, then contrary to what I have sug-
gested ‘S is justifi ed in believing p’ entails ‘S’s belief that p is justifi ed’ 
and ‘There is suffi cient justifi cation for S to believe p’.
There is no question that (10) seems contradictory. The question is 
whether (10) is a contradiction. I think that no one could truthfully 
assert (10). However, I think that what is asserted by (10) could be true. 
If we formulate it in the third-person, for example, I think there is noth-
ing wrong with asserting:
(11)  He is justifi ed in his belief. However, there is no justifi cation for 
that belief.
(11) seems no different from:
(12)  He believes p and I can defend him for believing that. The 
belief, however, is one I cannot defend.
If you think (12) is coherent, note that arguments that would purport to 
show that (11) is incoherent would show that (12) is incoherent. If you 
think there is no real difference between a justifi cation and a defense, 
(12) just says what (11) does.
If you still do not know what to make of the distinction between ascrip-
tions of personal and doxastic justifi cation, consider two exchanges. 
There has been a recent murder and Cooper has been called in to inves-
tigate. Over at the hotel, Audrey and Ben are arguing:
Audrey: Coop believes that Laura’s killer is going to be found 
soon.
Ben: He is a fool. There is no defending a guy like that. He has no 
good leads, and he should know better than to think he is getting 
any closer to fi guring out what really happened.
Audrey: You have no right to criticize Coop, Ben. If you were in 
his shoes and did not know how things worked around here, you 
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would think you were getting closer to fi guring out who killed 
Laura. Sure, maybe none of his leads will pan out, but they seem 
promising. He is surely justifi ed in thinking that he is going to 
catch Laura’s killer.
Meanwhile, Bobby and Donna are talking at the diner:
Bobby: Coop believes that Laura’s killer is going to be found 
soon.
Donna: Is there any justifi cation for thinking that?
Bobby: Not really. He thinks there is, but he has not fi gured out 
that this town is full of secrets. He will be chasing blind leads for 
a while now. Not that he is a fool, mind you. Anyone would think 
they were hot on the killer’s trail given his leads.
I do not think we have to say that Audrey and Bobby disagree. Audrey 
explicitly believes that Coop is justifi ed in his beliefs and Bobby seems 
not unwilling to accept that. However, if we can say Audrey and Bobby 
are not necessarily in disagreement, it is because we think they are 
making a distinction between an objective assessment of Coop’s beliefs 
which culminates in a judgment about whether there is a justifi cation 
of his belief and a more subjective assessment that culminates in a judg-
ment about Coop that also uses the language of justifi cation. If we think 
they need not disagree, we have to revise the standard view.
So, how could it be that (11) and (12) are true even if no one could 
truthfully assert (10)? When someone acts or believes, there are two 
kinds of criticism of the action or attitude. Some criticism implies fault. 
Some criticism implies wrong without implying fault. That is to say that 
the conditions under which someone can be faulted for having acted 
or believed are conditions that constitute a kind of wrong that must 
be absent if the attitude or action is justifi ed. If someone believes that 
there is no justifi cation for believing p, they can be faulted for believ-
ing p. That fact alone is suffi cient to ensure that they are not justifi ed in 
believing p and there is not suffi cient justifi cation for their belief that p. 
However, if an outside observer sees that there is not suffi cient justifi ca-
tion for the subject’s belief and sees that the believer is not in a position 
to appreciate this, she might defend the believer for having believed 
what she did while holding off from defending the belief. So, we can 
explain why (10) could never truthfully be asserted and why its asser-
tion strikes us as contradictory without the assumption that (SV1) is 
true. Thus, ordinary language does not support (SV1) and the oddity of 
(10) constitutes no evidence for (SV1). In fact, the dialogue suggests that 
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ordinary language allows for just the sort of distinction I have drawn 
between personal and doxastic justifi cation.
3. The Logic of Justifi cation Ascription
In their work on the logic of justifi cation ascriptions, Kvanvig and 
Menzel provide a separate argument for the claim that statements 
that ascribe personal justifi cation of the form ‘S is justifi ed in believ-
ing p’ entail statements that ascribe doxastic justifi cation of the form 
‘S’s belief that p is justifi ed’.19 They argue that personal justifi cation can 
be reduced to doxastic justifi cation as follows. First, they offer us an 
account of the truth-conditions for ascriptions of personal and doxastic 
justifi cation respectively as follows:
(PJ) ‘S is justifi ed in believing p’ is true iff S has the property of 
being the x such that x’s believing of p is justifi ed.
(DJ) ‘S’s belief that p is justifi ed’ is true iff S’s believing of p has the 
property of being justifi ed.
Those who want us to heed the (alleged) distinction between saying 
that it is the person who is justifi ed and saying that it is the belief the 
person holds that is justifi ed will say that what one does in ascribing 
personal justifi cation is say that the person is such that a certain kind of 
evaluation is fi tting. They claim that (PJ) does justice to this insofar as 
(PJ) captures the idea that an ascription of personal justifi cation is true 
in virtue of the person having a property (i.e., the property of being the 
person such that they have a justifi ed belief). As for (DJ), that clearly 
captures the idea that an ascription of doxastic justifi cation is true in 
virtue of the belief’s having a certain normative property. Note that 
the right-hand side of (PJ) could only be true if two conditions are met. 
First, that someone’s believing of p is justifi ed. Second, that someone is 
the subject, S. If the right-hand side of (PJ) is true, it cannot be that the 
right-hand side of (DJ) is false as it clearly follows from the assumption 
that S is the individual such that S’s believing of p is justifi ed that S’s 
believing of p is justifi ed.
If this argument were cogent it would vindicate (SV1). However, this 
proposal does not capture the spirit of the suggestion that we ought to 
distinguish personal from doxastic justifi cation. It fails to do justice to 
19 Kvanvig and Menzel (1990). They are critical of Bach’s (1985) suggestion that we 
can distinguish between ascriptions of personal and doxastic justifi cation.
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the idea that an ascription of personal justifi cation is about the person 
in saying that what it is to ascribe justifi cation to the person is to see 
them as being in possession of something that is justifi ed. Moreover, 
if the argument supported (SV1) it would prove far too much. For the 
argument would show that for any property, F, such that F can be attrib-
uted to either the agent or the agent’s attitude, there would be no excep-
tions to this general schema:
(GS) S is F in -ing iff S’s -ing is F.
Suppose while rushing through a crowded market, I knock over a small 
child. I should have been paying better attention, so we say:
(13)  I was responsible for knocking that child down.
It surely does not follow that:
(14)  My knocking the child down was responsible.
Or, suppose a morally conscientious person is forced to decide between 
two competing prima facie duties and the kind of confl ict we are consid-
ering is the kind of confl ict whose proper resolution reasonable people 
can disagree about. It seems that an agent compelled to make a decision 
might fail to discern which of the two duties takes precedence without 
being culpable for failing to have acted as she ought to have, which 
might lead us to say:
(15) Although she made the wrong decision, she is beyond 
criticism.
(16)  Although she made the wrong decision, her decision is beyond 
criticism.
Whereas (15) seems sensible, (16) is surely incorrect. If the subject’s fail-
ure to do what she ought is a non-culpable failure, that it was non-cul-
pable suggests that (15) is true. That it was a failure suggests that (16) 
is true. The argument for (SV1), which relies on (GS), if sound, would 
show that (16) is a consequence of (15). It seems we can use the lan-
guage of justifi cation to restate (15) and (16):
(17)  Although she made the wrong decision, she was justifi ed in 
having acted as she did.
(18)  Although she made the wrong decision, her decision was 
justifi ed.
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If you think, as I do, that (17) is a restatement of (15) and (18) a restate-
ment of (16), perhaps you will agree that (17) is acceptable, but (18) is 
not. There would be no question as to whether (17) entailed (18) if (GS) 
were true or (SV1) were true.
How are we to fi x Kvanvig and Menzel’s proposal? On the account I 
favor, to say that ‘S is justifi ed in believing p’ is to say that in light of the 
facts about the situation and the facts about S, S can be defended from 
criticism. To say that ‘S’s belief that p is justifi ed’ is to say that in light 
of the facts about the situation and the facts about S, S’s belief can be 
defended from criticism. We criticize agents using hypological concepts 
so that our criticism of agents has to do with fault and responsibility. 
We criticize attitudes using deontological concepts so that our criticism 
of attitudes has to do with whether the belief conforms to epistemic 
norms or there exist permissions to hold the attitudes in question. If 
we assume that fault constitutes a kind of wrong while assuming that 
not all wrongs imply fault, it follows that the conditions that determine 
whether ascriptions of personal justifi cation are true are a subset of the 
conditions that determine whether ascriptions of doxastic justifi cation 
are true. That is to say, because the deontological (i.e., the facts about 
permissibility) does not supervene on the hypological (i.e., the facts 
about culpability, responsibility, blameworthiness, praise), the facts 
about doxastic justifi cation do not supervene on the facts about per-
sonal justifi cation.20 As the denial of this supervenience thesis allows us 
to accept both Parity and Asymmetry, it seems we are moving closer to 
a view that accommodates internalist and externalist intuitions.
If we say that the notion of personal justifi cation is to be explicated 
using hypological concepts and the notion of doxastic justifi cation to 
be explicated using deontological concepts, the truth-conditions for 
ascriptions of personal and doxastic justifi cation could be understood 
as follows:
(PJ2)  ‘S is justifi ed in believing p’ is true iff S believes p and S should 
not have expected that there would be an undefeated reason 
against believing p.
20 The deontological cannot supervene on the hypological if it is possible for two 
agents to be equally responsible, blameless, excused, or what have you when one 
and only one manages to believe or do what there is overall reason to do, manage 
to do or believe what she ought, believe or do what is permissible, or only one 
believes or acts wrongly. So, if excusable wrongs are possible, the deontological 
cannot supervene on the hypological.
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(DJ2)  ‘S’s belief that p is justifi ed’ is true iff S believes p and it is 
not the case that S should have believed otherwise than 
believe p.21
4. Justifi cation, Excuse, and Permission
I have argued that the denial of the standard view is not incoherent and 
that we ought to revise the standard account of justifi cation by rejecting 
(SV1). Even if it is not incoherent to deny (SV1), it does not follow that 
we ought to deny (SV1). One reason to deny it is that by denying (SV1) 
we can accommodate a wider range of intuitions than we would if we 
accepted it. Is there any additional reason for rejecting (SV1)? I think so. 
I shall argue that you ought to reject (SV1) if you want to make sense of 
the distinction between permissions and excuses. Regrettably, the argu-
ment is complicated. I shall argue as follows. We fi rst focus on the cases 
21 To see what this amounts to, consider the view defended by Adler (2002), Bird 
(2007), and Sutton (2005) that knowledge is the norm of belief:
    K:  You ought not believe p unless you know p.
 Combined with this account, we would say that ‘S is justifi ed in believing p’ is true 
iff S believes p and should not have expected that her belief would not constitute 
knowledge. This allows us to say that if her belief about p unexpectedly fails to 
constitute knowledge, she is not unjustifi ed. However, if we say that to give a 
justifi cation of a belief is, inter alia, to argue that it conforms to the norms of belief, 
we would say that ‘S’s belief that p is justifi ed’ is true iff S’s belief that p constitutes 
knowledge. Suppose instead that you agree with Boghossian (2003) and Wedg-
wood (2007) that the norm of belief is the truth norm:
    T:  You ought not believe p unless you know p.
 We would say that ‘S is justifi ed in believing p’ is true iff S believes p and should 
not have assumed that her belief about p would not be mistaken. If we think some-
one who believes without suffi cient evidence ought not have assumed that they 
would not be mistaken, it follows from T that you cannot be justifi ed in your beliefs 
without suffi cient evidence. To say ‘S’s belief that p is justifi ed’ would require us to 
say that if p is false and you believe it, you ought to believe otherwise. Of course, it 
does not follow that you are not justifi ed in your belief. Now, could someone who 
adopted T explain why more than truth is necessary for having a justifi ed belief? I 
do not see why not. Depending upon your views about fault and permissibility, if 
you think (as I do) that not all wrongs imply fault but if someone can be faulted for 
a belief or action the belief or action is thereby wrongful, it follows that an ascrip-
tion of doxastic justifi cation cannot be true unless an ascription of personal justifi -
cation is true, too. So, if according to T, the ascription ‘S is justifi ed in believing p’ 
can only be true if S has positive evidence to support her belief about p, it follows 
that the ascription ‘S’s belief that p is justifi ed’ can only be true if S has positive 
evidence to support her belief about p. 
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that are taken to illustrate the distinction between permissible action 
and excusable wrongdoing. After distinguishing between two ways in 
which we might remove blame for having failed to do what one ought, 
we shall see that to capture the necessary distinctions between ways 
of removing blame and ways of denying wrongdoing we will want to 
draw on a distinction like the distinction between the subject being jus-
tifi ed and that which the subject does or believes being justifi ed. So, 
if you believe that the excuse/permission distinction is both coherent 
and non-empty and appreciate the difference between removing blame 
by offering an excuse and removing blame by offering an exemption, 
you should think of an excuse as suffi cient for the personal justifi cation 
without being suffi cient for doxastic justifi cation. Intuitively, a justifi ed 
action is an action such that it is not the case that it ought to have been 
otherwise. Intuitively, a justifi ed agent is an agent such that it is not the 
case that she ought to be blamed for that which she is responsible for. 
Applied to the case of belief, the beliefs that are justifi ed are the ones 
such that it is not the case that they ought to be replaced by something 
else (e.g., belief in the negation or suspension of judgment). The believ-
ers that are justifi ed are the ones who arrive at their beliefs in such a 
way that they ought not be criticized for holding the beliefs that they 
do.
Remember how this all started. We wanted to know whether we 
ought to say that Audrey and Cooper are equally justifi ed in their 
beliefs and what signifi cance does this have to the debate between the 
internalists and externalists. What I would like to suggest is that the 
reason that we can say (correctly) that Coop is justifi ed in believing 
what he does is that Coop ought to be excused even though he ought 
to believe otherwise. The reason that we can say (correctly) that only 
Audrey’s beliefs are justifi ed is that it is not the case that Audrey ought 
to believe otherwise. Against this proposal, many will either insist that 
you cannot accommodate the intuition that Coop is justifi ed in believ-
ing p by saying that he ought to be excused for believing what he does 
or insist that his being excused for believing p cannot be what suffi ces 
to establish that the ascription of personal justifi cation ‘Coop is justi-
fi ed in believing p’ is true.22 I shall try to show that these objections are 
unwarranted.
22 I shall argue that if an excuse is warranted, it is true that the agent who is excused 
from criticism was personally justifi ed in committing the wrong for which they are 
excused. I shall also argue that the cases of non-culpable error are cases in which 
excuses are appropriate. There will be some who insist that an ascription of per-
sonal justifi cation cannot be true simply because the person ought to be excused. 
Rather than suggest that there is nothing more to the claim that ‘S is justifi ed in 
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My proposal is that when Coop comes to mistakenly believe p on the 
basis of hallucinatory experience his belief is not justifi ed, but he is justi-
fi ed because he ought to be excused for failing to hold a belief for which 
there is adequate justifi cation, I will begin by looking at what inter-
nalists have said in anticipation of my response. Concerning cases of 
beliefs based on hallucinatory experiences, Audi offers these remarks:
… given the vivid hallucination, I am in no way at fault for believing what I do, 
nor do I deserve criticism. Far from it. I am like a surgeon who skillfully does all 
that can be expected but loses the patient. There I should feel regret, but not guilt; 
I should explain, but need not apologize; and when we know what my evidence 
was, we approve of what I did, we consider it reasonable.
As this passage indicates, Audi thinks that we ought to say that beliefs 
backed by hallucinatory experiences are justifi ed because we think they 
are reasonable, think the believer is not to be faulted, and we approve 
of the belief. Audi believes that there is a difference between justifi ed 
belief and excusable belief, and to illustrate the difference he asks us 
to imagine that someone has had a belief ‘stamped on the brain,’ per-
haps through a process of indoctrination or brainwashing, and says, 
‘an induced belief which one can do nothing to remove no matter 
how hard one tries is not thereby justifi ed; it is excusable, but not well-
grounded.’23 Wedgwood also offers cases of temporary insanity as his 
example of excusable wrongdoing. If someone shoots and kills another 
in self-defense, he says, that is a justifi ed killing. If someone shoots and 
kills another because he has gone temporarily insane, that killing is 
excusable.24
Note that both authors take as their example of excusable wrongs 
examples in which an agent has lost control of her attitudes or actions or 
has had her capacity for responding to reasons seriously compromised 
so that in their examples of excusable wrongs, the agent’s ‘response’ 
to the reasons there is nothing that would lead us to affi rm the sub-
ject’s normative competence. When someone’s actions or attitudes are 
justifi ed, however, we think that their actions or attitudes are justifi ed 
because we think that they are reasonable. I think this is inadequate. To 
believing p’ than ‘S’s believing p is excusable’, I could instead offer an error-theory 
and say that the reason people have mistakenly said that Parity is true and Coop 
is justifi ed in his beliefs about the external world which are backed by hallucina-
tory experiences is that they harbor some misconceptions about when excuses are 
appropriate and when justifi cations are. 
23 Audi (1993: 28)
24 Wedgwood (2002: 349)
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see why, let us focus on the practical examples. There is nothing wrong 
with saying that if someone kills in self-defense the killing is justifi ed. 
It is not an abuse of language to say that someone who kills another 
because they have gone temporarily insane ought to be excused. How-
ever, there is a third case to consider. What are we to say about cases of 
‘imperfect’ self-defense? That is, what are we to make of cases in which 
an agent kills someone believing mistakenly that self-defense justifi es 
such a killing?25
I think it is clear that they are not inexcusable. It is clear that if the 
subject is non-culpably mistaken about the facts of the case (e.g., mis-
taken in thinking that someone is coming after her with a weapon), 
she ought to be excused for the killing even if she ought to have acted 
otherwise. If we think that in cases of imperfect self-defense the kill-
ing is excused and the killing is justifi ed, that we think of such cases as 
excusable wrongs forces us to deny:
(JO)  If S’s -ing is justifi ed, it is not the case that S ought to do other 
than .
But, for reasons alluded to earlier, (JO) is not the sort of thing we ought 
to deny. If there were more to -ing when one ought than -ing being 
justifi ed, you get the odd result that someone might know that -ing 
would be justifi ed without being in a position to judge that she may  
or ought to . And if we thought of deliberation as a matter of refl ect-
ing on the reasons to come to a judgment about whether -ing is over-
all justifi ed, denying (JO) forces us to say that deliberation does not so 
much as address questions about what one ought to do or believe. (Or, 
alternatively, deliberation is concerned with questions about what one 
ought to do or believe, but does not directly concern the justifi cation 
of the actions or attitudes in question.) If the fact that there is suffi cient 
justifi cation for S to  were insuffi cient for putting S in a position to  
permissibly, it would make sense for an external advisor to knowingly 
advise S by saying ‘There is suffi cient justifi cation for you to ’ while 
conceding that she does not know whether S ought to do other than .
Suppose we say that cases of imperfect self-defense are cases of 
excusable killing and that cases of self-defense are cases of justifi ed kill-
25 Moore (1997) refers to such cases as cases of imperfect self-defense. It is important 
that we assume in such cases that the subject is motivated by the belief that the 
killing would be justifi ed by self-defense, knows what sorts of conditions would 
justify such a killing, is not culpable for believing falsely that the circumstances are 
such as to justify such a killing, and is not motivated by malice or anything but the 
desire for self-defense.
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ing. What of it? It seems that cases of imperfect self-defense are in some 
respects like cases of in which someone kills because they have gone 
temporarily insane and in other respects like cases of justifi able killing 
in self-defense. Like cases of temporary insanity, the agent who intends 
to kill in cases of imperfect-self defense has lost the right to non-inter-
ference and this reinforces the idea that they ought to act otherwise. 
Like cases of justifi able killing, however, we can only say that the agent 
in question ought not be blamed for the killing if we can say that the 
subject is normatively competent. We would not regard the killing in 
cases of imperfect self-defense as excusable unless we regarded the 
agent as reasonable.
It is here that Strawson’s distinction between excuses and exemptions 
is useful.26 He observed that there are three ways to remove blame. If S 
’s and someone blames her for that, you can either show that blame 
is inappropriate because S ought to have ’d (i.e., offer a justifi cation 
for S’s -ing), show that blame is inappropriate because S ought not 
be thought of as a responsible agent (i.e., offer an exemption), or show 
that blame is inappropriate because while S is a responsible agent it is 
a mistake to take her having failed to  with justifi cation as an indica-
tion that she is responsible for the failure (i.e., to offer an excuse in the 
strict sense). What I shall argue is that the standard view of justifi cation 
ascriptions stands in the way of making sense of the distinction between 
excuses and exemptions and that to make sense of this scheme, we will 
want to do two things. We will want to say that personal justifi cation is 
insuffi cient for justifi ed action or belief. We will want to say that noth-
ing more than an excuse is necessary for personal justifi cation.
So, consider our three cases:
(I)  S kills S’ because S has gone temporarily insane [Exemption].
(II)  S kills S’ because S believes mistakenly, but non-culpably, that 
S’ is trying to kill S and knows that if S’ is trying to kill S, shoot-
ing S’ is the only way to fend off the attack [Excuse].27
(III)  S shoots and kills S’ in self-defense [Justifi ed Action].
26 Strawson (2003). Horder (2004) speaks of this distinction in terms of the distinction 
between denials of responsibility and excuses. 
27 Moore (1997), Robinson (1996), and Zimmerman (2004) would regard imperfect 
self-defense as an instance of excusable wrongdoing. For an argument that the 
propriety of such excuses depends on showing the agent’s actions in a favorable 
moral light without thereby offering a crypto-justifi cation, see Gardner (1998). 
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Suppose a defender of Internalism proposes this scheme:
(S1)  S is justifi ed in pulling the trigger in (II) and (III), but not (I).
If this fi rst scheme is correct, according to (SV1), S’s pulling the trig-
ger and killing S’ in (II) and (III) is justifi ed. According to (JO), it is not 
the case that S ought to have done other than pulled the trigger in (II) 
and (III). But that contradicts the assumption that (II) is an instance of 
excusable wrongdoing.
To avoid this diffi culty, someone might propose this scheme:
(S2)  S is justifi ed in pulling the trigger in (III), but not in (II) or (I).
If we assume (JO), we get the correct result that it is not the case that 
S ought to have done other than shoot in (III). We avoid the incorrect 
result that S was permitted to pull the trigger in (II). However, now that 
we are using the concept of justifi cation to distinguish (II) from (III), we 
cannot use it in distinguishing (I) from (II). How could someone accept 
Internalism, (SV1), and (S2) explain the difference between (I) and (II)? 
How could they explain the difference between someone who ought to 
be excused for having killed and someone who ought to be exempted 
from criticism? It seems that the natural way to mark the difference is 
as follows. The agent who is to be excused is unlike the agent who is 
to be exempted insofar as the agent is rational and responsible. If we 
judge of such an agent that she failed to do what she ought and wish 
to remove blame, we have to think of her response to the demands she 
was under as being other than they ought to have been, but reasonable. 
If the shooter were led by unreasonable beliefs to shoot, we would regard 
her as blameworthy and her action inexcusable. If we say that an agent 
who is to be excused for having ’d and cannot be exempted for having 
’d is such as to have been reasonable in having ’d, (S2) forces us to 
reject the following claim:
 (RJ)  If S was reasonable in ’ing, S was justifi ed in -ing.28
Can internalists reject (RJ)? I think not. When we judge that someone 
was reasonable in having ’d, we tend to focus on how things are from 
their perspective and ask whether someone with such a perspective on 
28 Cohen (1984) claims that ‘reasonable’ and ‘justifi ed’ are synonymous. While I 
think there is a sense in which the reasonable and the justifi ed come together, there 
is another sense in which they do not.
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the situation should have known better than to assume that in -ing 
they would not  against an undefeated reason. If we think they should 
have known better than to assume that, we regard them as unreason-
able. If we think they should not have known better than to assume 
that, we regard them as reasonable. So if the question as to whether S is 
reasonable is settled by S’s non-factive mental states, but the fact that S 
is reasonable does not entail that S is justifi ed, we have to assume that 
the facts about justifi cation fail to supervene on the facts about what is 
reasonable for S to believe or do. And owing to Internalism about the 
facts about what is reasonable to do, it follows that Internalism fails as 
a constraint on what facts bear on what there is adequate justifi cation 
for believing or doing.
Internalists cannot reject (RJ). Rejecting (JO) would force us to seri-
ously revise our ordinary practice of normative appraisal. Internalists 
who insist that the standard view of justifi cation ascriptions is correct 
cannot make sense of the distinctions we want to draw concerning the 
cases (I)-(III). That is to say, they cannot make sense of the distinctions 
between exemptions, excuses, and the justifi cation of actions or atti-
tudes. Revising (SV1), it becomes much easier to make sense of these 
distinctions. To say that someone is to be excused from criticism (and not 
exempted) is to describe the agent as being reasonable while remaining 
neutral on the further question as to whether they ought to have acted 
or believed in ways other than they actually did. If there is nothing 
more to show that the person is justifi ed than to showing that the per-
son can be defended from criticism, showing that they are reasonable 
and affi rming their normative competence ought to suffi ce to show that 
they are justifi ed. What allows us to maintain the distinction between 
(a) showing that the person is justifi ed and ought to be excused and (b) 
showing that what the person did or believed is also justifi ed requires 
us to reject (SV1). This allows us to say that an action is or an attitude 
justifi ed only if it is not the case that it ought to have been different. This 
allows us to maintain the distinction between excusable wrongs and 
attitudes or actions that justifi ed.
IV  Conclusion
Let’s take stock. We began by looking at an argument against External-
ism. The new evil demon argument takes intuitions most of us share 
and tries to show that such intuitions are incompatible with External-
ism. I have argued that there is no such incompatibility. The additional 
assumptions needed for a valid argument from Parity to Internalism 
are problematic. I then suggested that there were additional intuitions 
that supported Externalism. Either this means that our intuitions are 
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an incoherent mess or that there is some way of making sense of the lot 
of them. I tried to make sense of them by means of the suggestion that 
the truth of ascriptions of personal justifi cation of the form ‘S is justi-
fi ed in believing p’ depends upon how things are with S’s non-factive 
mental states while allowing that the truth of ascriptions of doxastic 
justifi cation of the form ‘S’s belief that p is justifi ed’ can be affected by 
facts external to the subject’s mind. This distinction proves useful not 
only in trying to make sense of our intuitive sense of which justifi cation 
ascriptions are appropriate but also in trying to make sense of the more 
familiar distinction between right action and excusable wrongdoing. 
The major obstacle to this suggestion is that some doubt the coherence 
of the distinction, but that obstacle has been overcome.
The aim of this paper was not to bring the Internalism/Externalism 
debate to a close, but to show that an argument that has been taken 
to bring that debate to a close is far from compelling. The allegation 
that defenders of Externalism suffer from some sort of tin ear and can-
not do justice to our ordinary sense of which justifi cation ascriptions 
are appropriate is unwarranted. I do think that if externalists were so 
inclined, they could build an impressive case for their view by appeal 
to intuition and general theoretical considerations concerning the rela-
tionship between justifi cation and other deontological concepts. That 
will have to wait for another time.29
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